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Abstract—We study the problem of constructing secure regen-
erating codes that protect data integrity in distributed storage
systems (DSS) in which some nodes may be compromised by a
malicious adversary. The adversary can corrupt the data stored
on and transmitted by the nodes under its control. The “damage”
incurred by the actions of the adversary depends on how much
information it knows about the data in the whole DSS. We focus
on the limited-knowledge model in which the adversary knows
only the data on the nodes under its control. The only secure
capacity-achieving codes known in the literature for this model
are for the bandwidth-limited regime and repair degree d = n−1,
i.e., when a node fails in a DSS with n nodes all the remaining
n − 1 nodes are contacted for repair. We extend these results
to the more general case of d ≤ n− 1 in the bandwidth-limited
regime. Our capacity-achieving scheme is based on the use of
product-matrix codes with special hashing functions and allow
the identification of the compromised nodes and their elimination
from the DSS while preserving the data integrity.
Index Terms—Distributed storage, regenerating codes, infor-
mation theoretic security, malicious adversary
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of securing data in distributed
storage systems (DSS) under failure and repair (rebuilding) dy-
namics against a malicious adversary that can control a certain
number of nodes in the system. DSS experience frequent node
failures due to the use of inexpensive commodity hardware
[1], [2]. Data redundancy is used to prevent from data loss.
Typically, replication codes are used and multiple copies of
the data, typically 3, are stored in the DSS. Recently, major
cloud storage companies [3], [4] have started using erasure
codes, such as regenerating codes [5] and locally repairable
codes [3], to achieve data reliability with a lower storage cost
and better tradeoffs with other system resources, such as repair
bandwidth and data locality.
We assume that there is an adversary that can corrupt the
data stored on the nodes under its control and all of their
outgoing messages. The damage incurred by the adversary
depends on how much information it knows about the stored
file. We focus on the limited-knowledge model [6], [7] in
which the only information the adversary knows about the
stored data comes from reading the data on the nodes under
its control. This is in contrast with an omniscient adversary that
although it controls a limited number of nodes, it has complete
knowledge of all the data in the DSS. Due to the distributed
nature of DSS, a limited-knowledge adversary may be a more
suitable model in many applications.
Classical codes, such as Reed-Solomon codes, can be used
to correct errors. However, they may not be well suited to
the secure distributed storage problem under consideration, for
two main reasons: (1) they are designed for an omniscient
adversary or random errors, (2) they result in high repair
bandwidth. Take for instance a replication code that stores
4 copies of a file on 4 different storage nodes, one of which
is controlled by an adversary. If one of the other nodes fails
and is repaired by contacting the remaining 3 nodes, it has to
download all their data in order to do majority decoding and
regenerate an uncorrupted copy of the file. This corresponds to
a repair bandwidth equal to 3 times the size of the stored file.
To address these challenges, we construct regenerating codes
that can secure the data and enable an efficient repair process.
Our objective is to achieve information theoretic security
of the data that guarantees security even if the adversary has
unlimited computation power. Computational security can be
possibly achieved by storing on a trusted server cryptographic
hash functions (SHA-2, etc.) of the data on each node.
Then, the hashes of the downloaded data can be computed
and compared to the trusted hashes to determine possible
corruption. This would work given the empirical assumption
that it is computationally hard for the adversary to create a
hash collision. Here, we do not make this assumption and show
that there is no extra cost for achieving information theoretic
security (as opposed to the omniscient case). Applications may
include long term storage [8], as hash functions that are hard
to break now are more likely to be broken in the future.
Related work: The problem of studying the information
theoretic security of DSS with repair dynamics was first
studied in [6], [9], [10], where different adversarial models
were considered: passive (eavesdropper), active (omniscient
vs. limited-knowledge). Further results on achieving security
in the DSS against eavesdropping appeared in [11]–[14] and
omniscient adversary in [15], [16]. Schemes for protecting data
in DSS against random errors were studied in [17], [18].
Contribution: An upper bound on the secure capacity
of the DSS, also called resiliency capacity, for the limited-
knowledge model was proved in [6] (see Eq. (1)), as well
as a scheme that achieves this upper bound in the bandwidth-
limited regime. This scheme is restricted to a repair degree d =
n− 1, i.e., all remaining nodes are contacted to repair a failed
node. In this paper, we prove that the upper bound in [6] is
achievable for any possible d < n−1 in the bandwidth-limited
regime provided that the number of compromised nodes is
below a certain limit. Thus, we characterize the secure capacity
of the DSS for the limited-knowledge adversary for the regime
we consider. Our proof is constructive and is based on using
the hashing schemes of [6] with an alternative representation
of Product-Matrix codes [19]. Compared to the scheme of [6],
our scheme not only allows secure data reconstruction by the
user, but also allows the regeneration of an uncorrupted exact
copy of the lost data during repair from a failure.
Organization: The paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we describe the system and adversary model. In
Sec. III, we state our main result. We follow by first describing
our secure code construction in Sec. IV and an example on the
decoding algorithm in Sec. V. The proof of the main result is
given in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
An (n, k, d) DSS is formed of n unreliable nodes
{1, 2, . . . , n}, each with a storage capacity equal to α symbols.
A DSS allows any legitimate user to reconstruct its stored
file by connecting to any k out of the n nodes. Thus, it can
tolerate n − k simultaneous failures. We assume that the file
symbols are the realizations of iid random variables uniformly
distributed over a finite field.
When a node fails, the DSS is repaired by replacing the
failed node with a new one. The new node connects to d, k ≤
d ≤ n − 1, helper nodes, chosen out of the remaining n − 1
active ones, and downloads β symbols from each. These β
symbols are processed and the result is stored on the new node.
So, we have α ≤ dβ. The literature distinguishes between two
types of repair: exact repair where the regenerated data on
the new node is an exact copy of the lost data, and functional
repair where it is functionally equivalent in the sense that it
retains the codes properties of file reconstruction and repair.
Functional repair is more tractable for theoretical analysis,
whereas practical systems typically require exact repair.
Adversary model: Our objective is to guarantee data relia-
bility and integrity even when b nodes in the DSS are com-
promised by an adversary. We focus on a limited-knowledge
adversary that controls b nodes and can read and corrupt all
their stored data and/or their messages sent to other nodes
during repair or to the users during file reconstruction. The
only information the limited-adversary has about the stored
data comes from the data on the nodes under its control. This
is in contrast with an omniscient adversary that knows the
data on all the nodes but controls only few nodes. We assume
that the adversary has complete knowledge of the storage and
repair schemes implemented in the DSS.
Trusted server: In addition to the the previous setting, there
is a special node, referred to as a trusted server1, that can
never be compromised by an adversary. The trusted server
is considered to be an expensive resource and has a limited
storage capacity. So, it cannot be used to store the data in the
DSS. It will be used to store hashes of the data.
1 In case the trusted server does not exist, it can be emulated using the
nodes in the DSS using the technique in [6], [7].
III. MAIN RESULT
The secure capacity Cs of a DSS against an adversary was
defined in [6], [10] to be the maximum amount of information
that a user contacting k nodes can always decode with an
arbitrarily small probability of error and after any number of
(functional) repairs. The following upper bound was proven
in [6] in the case of a limited-knowledge adversary,
Cs ≤
k∑
i=b+1
min {α, (d− i+ 1)β} . (1)
Setting b = 0, i.e., when there is no adversary, we recover
part of the original result in [5] on the storage vs. repair
bandwidth tradeoff for a file of size B,
B ≤
k∑
i=1
min {α, (d− i+ 1)β} . (2)
Each term in the summation in Eq. (2) accounts for the
contribution of each of the k nodes which is at most α
symbols, but can be less due to correlation between the data
on the different nodes. Therefore, an intuitive justification of
Eq. 1 is that one strategy of the adversary is to always delete
the data on the nodes under its control (say always change it
the all zero sequence). This results in the loss of the data on
b nodes, which in the worst case, can be among the k nodes
contacted by the user. It is worth mentioning that the effect of
an omniscient adversary is the loss of 2b nodes from the DSS
and the following upper bound was the shown in [6], [10],
Cs ≤
∑k
i=2b+1 min {α, (d− i+ 1)β} which can be regarded
as a generalization of the Singleton bound. This bound was
shown to be achievable in certain regimes [6], [10], [15].
The only achievability result for the upper bound in Eq. 1 is
known for d = n− 1 in the bandwidth-limited regime. In this
regime, the only restriction is on the repair bandwidth β and
there is no restriction on the storage capacity of a node α, in
particular α ≥ dβ (the new node can store all the downloaded
data). Our main results stated in Th. 1 asserts the achievability
of this bound in the bandwidth-limited regime (including the
the so-called minimum-bandwidth regime (MBR)) for any
possible repair degree d as long as b < k/2.
Theorem 1: The secure capacity of an (n, k, d) DSS with
exact repair in the bandwidth limited regime is given by
Cs =
k∑
i=b+1
(d− i+ 1)β, (3)
when b < k/2 nodes are compromised by a limited
knowledge-adversary.
The proof of Th. 1 is constructive and the rest of the paper
will be dedicated to describing the scheme that achieves the
secure capacity.
IV. SECURE CODE CONSTRUCTION
Our construction is based on the Product-Matrix (PM) codes
introduced by Rashmi et al. in [19] and the correlation hashing
scheme in [6]. We introduce a representation of PM codes that
is equivalent to the original codes in [19] in the sense that
one can be obtained as an invertible linear transformation of
the other. This representation reflects the intuition behind our
secure scheme and simplifies the proof.
Original MBR PM code: We consider an (n, k, d) DSS.
WLOG, we assume the repair bandwidth per link β is normal-
ized to 1 (β = 1). We choose α = dβ = d, which corresponds
to the MBR regime. We will explain the construction with
an example by taking (n, k, d) = (7, 3, 4) and following
the notation in [19]. The maximum file size that can be
stored is B = 9 (see Eq. (2)). The encoding matrix is
an n × d Vandermonde matrix Ψ with elements in Fq. We
denote the ith row of Ψ by
¯
ψi. The stored file is denoted by
¯
U = (U1, ..., UB), where the symbols Ui ∈ Fqv are packets of
length v. The message symbols are arranged in an d×d matrix
M =
[
S T
T t 0
]
, where, S is a k× k symmetric matrix and
T is a k × (d − k) matrix and 0 is a (d − k)× (d − k) zero
matrix. For our example,
Ψ =


1 1 1 1
1 2 4 8
1 3 9 5
1 4 5 9
1 5 3 4
1 6 3 7
1 7 5 2


, M =


U1 U2 U3 U7
U2 U4 U5 U8
U3 U5 U6 U9
U7 U8 U9 0

 ,
where Ψ is defined over F11. Node i stores the coded vector
Wi =
¯
ψiM . For example on node 1 we store
¯
ψ1M =[
1 1 1 1
]
M . For details on repair and file reconstruc-
tion we refer the reader to [19].
Modified PM code representation:
We define Xij ∈ Fqv , i, j ≤ n, i 6= j, to be the symbol
sent by node i to node j when node j is being repaired.
From [19], we know that Xij =
¯
ψiM
¯
ψtj (the superscript t
denotes the transpose operation). Note that Xij = Xji because
M is symmetric. On each node i, we store any α = 4
different symbols among Xi1, . . . , Xi,j−1, Xi,j+1, . . . , Xin.
WLOG, we store the first α = 4 symbols as described in
Table I.
node 1 X12 X13 X14 X15 {X16,X17}
node 2 X21 X23 X24 X25 {X26,X27}
node 3 X31 X32 X34 X35 {X36,X37}
node 4 X41 X42 X43 X45 {X46,X47}
node 5 X51 X52 X53 X54 {X56,X57}
node 6 X61 X62 X63 X64 {X65,X67}
node 7 X71 X72 X73 X74 {X75,X76}
TABLE I
SYMBOLS STORED ON EACH NODE IN THE MODIFIED PM CODE REPRESENTATION.
THE SYMBOLS BETWEEN BRACES ({}) ARE NOT STORED BUT CAN BE COMPUTED
USING THE STORED SYMBOLS.
Here, the data stored on node i, say W ′i , can be written
as W ′i = WiL, with L being an invertible matrix, hence the
equivalence of the two representations. For instance, W ′1 =
¯
ψ1M [
¯
ψt2
¯
ψt3
¯
ψt4
¯
ψt5] = W1L, where L = [
¯
ψt2
¯
ψt3
¯
ψt4
¯
ψt5] is
invertible because it is a submatrix of the Vandermonde matrix
Ψ. Therefore, the exact repair and file reconstruction properties
are directly inherited from the original PM codes.
For each node i, any of the symbols Xij’s, can be computed
from any α = 4 other symbols (follows directly from Ψ
being a Vandermonde matrix). Therefore, if node 1 is being
repaired by contacting helper nodes 2, 3, 4, 5, then it down-
loads X12, X13, X14, X15 from each respectively. However, if
it contacts say 2, 3, 4, 6, then it downloads X12, X13, X14, X16
from each respectively. Then, computes X15 using the down-
loaded data and stores X12, X13, X14, X15.
The hashes: The correlation hashing scheme introduced in
[6] will be used to cross-check the data on the different
nodes against each other and will allow to detect the com-
promised nodes (with high probability) when used with PM
codes. We abuse notation and write Xij as a vector in Fvq ,
Xij = (X
1
ij , X
2
ij , . . . , X
v
ij), where Xkij ∈ Fq . The hash of two
distinct symbols Xij and Xlk is defined as the dot product
Xij .X
t
lk =
∑v
s=1X
s
ijX
s
lk ∈ Fq . All these hashes are stored
on the trusted server and cannot be corrupted by the adversary.
V. SECURE DECODING ALGORITHM: EXAMPLE
Here, we describe how the hashing scheme in [6] can be
used with the PM codes to achieve security. We describe the
secure repair and file reconstruction scheme through an exam-
ple. Consider the problem of securing an (n, k, d) = (7, 4, 5)
DSS against an adversary controlling b = 1 node(s). We
use the (n, k′ = k − b, d′ = d − b) = (7, 3, 4) PM code
described in Sec. IV. Note that, k = 4 and d = 5 nodes will
still be contacted during file reconstruction and node repair
respectively, i.e., b = 1 extra node(s) more than what the
actual PM code is designed for is contacted. The idea is to
use the hashes to identify the compromised node, then ignore
its data by treating it as an erasure. The back-off of b in
k and d will allow to repair and reconstruct the data even
in the presence of the erasure. Therefore, we can guarantee
the security of the data in the system and can detect and
report the compromised nodes. In the following discussion,
we focus on the detection of the corrupted nodes. Notice that
the limited-knowledge adversary controlling b = 1 node(s),
say node 3, can observe the data stored on this node and only
b = 1 symbol(s) on each other node. This happens because
X3i = Xi3 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
A. Secure repair
Assume WLOG that in Table I node 3 is compromised and
that node 2 fails. The new node contacts d = 5 nodes, say
nodes 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 for repair. Each helper node h sends
Xh2 = X2h to the new node 2. The new node computes the
correlation hashes of the downloaded data and compares it to
the corresponding hashes downloaded from the trusted server.
Then, it constructs the symmetric comparison table similar to
the example shown in table II.
The repaired node looks for a column with 2 ×’s or more to
identify the compromised node. The reason is that a column
with a single ×, say in the entry corresponding to X12 and
X12 X32 X42 X52 X62
X12 × X X X
X32 × × × ×
X42 X × X X
X52 X × X X
X62 X × X X
TABLE II
A COMPARISON OF THE COMPUTED HASHES OF THE DOWNLOADED DATA VS. THE
DOWNLOADED HASHES FROM THE TRUSTED SERVER. A BLANK INDICATES THAT THE
PRODUCT IS NOT COMPUTED, A X INDICATES THAT THE HASHES ARE EQUAL, WHILE
AN × INDICATES THAT THE HASHES DO NOT MATCH.
X32, is confusing and can mean either node 2 or node 3 are
compromised.
The example in Table II assumes the ideal case in which all
the corrupted symbols result in a hash mismatch. However, the
adversary can always attempt to corrupt the data in a way to
match the downloaded hashes, i.e, create a hash collision. For
example, it will be able to fool the new node if it manages to
change at least 3 ×’s into X’s in the column of X32. However,
its observation consisting of only (X31, X32, X34, X35) here,
is uncorrelated (linearly independent) with the other down-
loaded packets X12, X42, X52 (follows from the construction
of PM codes). And, its best strategy cannot be better than
introducing random errors which could be caught with high
probability (see Section V-C). After identifying the compro-
mised node(s), the new node will regenerate the lost data using
the symbols received from the other helper nodes and report
the compromised node(s).
B. Secure reconstruction
To reconstruct a file, a user contacts any k = 4 nodes, say
nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4, downloads all their symbols and computes
their correlation hashes. Then, the user compares the computed
hashes with their corresponding ones downloaded from the
trusted server and constructs a k × k = 4 × 4 block-table
formed of blocks each of size (d − b) × (d − b) = 4 × 4.
Table III depicts part of such table corresponding to nodes 3
and 4.
We say that a block is mismatched if it has at least one ×. In
the reconstruction block-table, the column corresponding to a
non-compromised node will contain at most b = 1 mismatched
block(s). Therefore, the user will identify the compromised
node by looking for a column with more than one mismatched
block. The user then discards the data from the compromised
node and decode the file using the symbols downloaded from
the other 3 nodes. It can do so because the underlying PM code
has an effective k′ = 3. Here too, the adversary can attempt
to avoid being detected by choosing erroneous symbols that
lead to a match between the computed and trusted hashes. For
instance here, the adversary needs to flip all the ×’s in two
blocks in the column of node 3 in order to be undetected.
Next, we will analyze the probability of this event and show
that it can be made arbitrarily small.
C. Error analysis
The error analysis in [6] can be applied here to prove that
the probability of failing to detect a compromised node during
node 3 node 4
X31 X32 X34 X35 X41 X42 X43 X45
n
o
de
1
X12 × × × × X X X X
X13 X X X X X X X X
X14 × × × × X X X X
X15 × × × × X X X X
n
o
de
2 X21 × × × × X X X X
X23 X X X X X X X X
X24 × × × × X X X X
X25 × × × × X X X X
n
o
de
3 X31 × × X ×
X32 × × X ×
X34 × × X ×
X35 × × X ×
n
o
de
4 X41 × × × ×
X42 × × × ×
X43 X X X X
X45 × × × ×
TABLE III
PART OF THE RECONSTRUCTION HASH TABLE FORMED BY A USER CONTACTING
NODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4. THE COLUMNS CORRESPONDING TO NODES 1 AND 2 ARE
OMITTED HERE DUE TO SPACE CONSTRAINTS.
repair or reconstruction is upper bounded by 1/q and therefore
can be made as small as desired by increasing q. Suppose the
adversary wants to flip an × to a X in a comparison table,
say the × corresponding to X12 and X32 in Table II. It can
introduce an error e to X32 as to change it to X32+e and will
succeed in flipping the entry in the table if e is orthogonal to
X12. Assuming the symbols of the original file are iid and
uniformly distributed over Fvq , for a fixed error e ∈ Fvq ,
there are qv−1 possible values of X12 that are orthogonal to
e. Hence, the probability of e being orthogonal to one symbol
given the adversary’s observation is
P (e⊥X12) =
qv−1
qv
=
1
q
.
Of course, if the adversary were omniscient it would know the
value of X12 and can choose a value of e that is orthogonal
to X12. Note that the adversary needs to flip many entries
in the comparison table to fool the secure repair and/or the
reconstruction algorithms described earlier. These events are
not independent and we upper bound the probability of error,
i.e., adversary being undetected, by 1/q.
VI. PROOF OF MAIN RESULT
We show that the code construction described in Sec. IV
based on PM codes and correlation hashes achieves the
resiliency capacity in Th. 1. To secure an (n, k, d) DSS
against an adversary controlling b nodes, the construction
uses an (n, k′ = k − b, d′ = d − b) minimum-bandwidth
regenerating PM code with storage per node α = (d − b)β.
These codes achieve the (non-secure) optimal storage/repair
bandwidth tradeoff and can store a file of size B =∑k−b
i=1 min {α, (d− b− i+ 1)β} symbols [5], [19]. A simple
change of variables shows that B = Cs. We prove Th. 1 by
showing that these B symbols can be secured by following
the secure repair and secure decoding rules in Sec V.
A. Secure repair
If a node f fails, the new node contacts d helper nodes,
h1, h2, . . . , hd for repair. Each of the helper nodes send Xhif
to the new node. In addition, the new node downloads all the
hashes Xhif ·Xhjf from the trusted server and forms a repair
comparison table similar to Table II. WLOG, suppose that
among the helper nodes exactly b nodes are compromised2.
Also, suppose the ideal case that every transmitted packet
corrupted by the adversary results in an × in the comparison
table. An uncorrupted node will contain at most b ×’s in its
column. Therefore, every helper node corresponding to more
than b ×’s must be a compromised node.
Secure repair rule: The repaired node decides that any
helper node corresponding to a column (or a row) in the
comparison table with more than b ×’s is a compromised node.
The adversary can try to avoid being detected by causing
errors that lead to switching at least d − b ×’s into X’s in
columns corresponding to nodes under its control. However,
since we assume that b < k/2 the adversary knows zero
information about the symbols sent by the helpers node
that are not under its control (a property of the underlying
(n, k−b, d−b) PM code). Therefore, the error analysis detailed
in Sec. V-C holds here and the probability of the adversary
succeeding, i.e., causing undetected erroneous repair data, is
upper bounded by 1/q.
B. Secure reconstruction
A user that wants to reconstruct the file contacts k nodes
and downloads all their stored data (α = d− b symbols from
each node). In addition, it contacts the trusted server and
downloads all the hashes corresponding to the downloaded
symbols. WLOG, suppose that b nodes among those which
were contacted are compromised. Then, the user forms the
reconstruction block-table between the trusted hashes and
computed hashes as done in Table III.
Each block contains the hashes cross-checking the symbols
downloaded from two different nodes. A mismatched block
indicates that one of these two nodes is sending corrupted
packets and therefore is compromised. Hereafter, a node
having more than b + 1 mismatched blocks has to be com-
promised. Otherwise, the b + 1 other nodes corresponding to
the mismatched blocks are all compromised which contradicts
our initial assumption that there are at most b compromised
nodes. Therefore, the user implements the following rule:
Secure reconstruction rule: The user decides that any node
having more than b mismatched blocks in its row or column
is a compromised node.
Treating the b compromised nodes as erasures, the user
recovers the data using the k − b other contacted nodes.
Moreover, it reports the identity of the compromised nodes.
Note that if b ≥ k/2, then the limited-knowledge adversary
can decode the whole file and is actually omniscient. In this
case, our scheme cannot be used to achieve security since the
adversary can carefully choose the errors as to switch all the
×’s into X’s in the comparison tables. If b < k/2, then on
each uncompromised node there is at least one symbol that
2The analysis stays the same even if less than b helper nodes happen to be
compromised.
the adversary does not have information about, and the error
analysis in Sec. V-C holds again here.
C. Hash storage overhead
The total number of stored hashes is
(
θ
2
)
symbols in Fq,
where θ =
(
n
2
)
is the total number of the Xij symbols. The
ratio of the hash size to the stored data size is (
θ
2
)
nαv
= O( 1
v
)
which can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the packet
length v. In the given example this ratio is 210
7×4v =
15
2v
.
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